We present a methodology for represent ing probabilistic relationships in a general equilibrium economic model. Specifically, we define a precise mapping from a Bayesian net work with binary nodes to a market price sys tem where consumers and producers trade in uncertain propositions. We demonstrate the correspondence between the equilibrium prices of goods in this economy and the prob abilities represented by the Bayesian net work. A computational market model such as this may provide a useful framework for in vestigations of belief aggregation, distributed probabilistic inference, resource allocation under uncertainty, and other problems of de centralized uncertainty.
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GENERAL MOTIVATIONS
A principled market model for Bayesian inference would potentially address a variety of important and interesting problems of distributed uncertain reason ing. Although the particular contributions of our work to date do not deliver on these general problems, we present the big picture at the outset as underlying mo tivation for our specific developments.
There are several reasons one might want to build mar kets for probabilistic reasoning. Researchers in un certain reasoning are likely to be acquainted with the first two aims enumerated in sections below. The third may be more familiar to those with some background in economics. The approach we follow in this work owes much to both economic theory (especially general equilibrium under uncertainty) and uncertain reason ing technology (especially Bayesian networks).
1.1
AGGREG ATING BELIEFS
Given several agents with incompatible beliefs, how can we aggregate their individual beliefs into a char acterization of the group's beliefs? This is a clas sical question in uncertain reasoning, one that has eluded defi nitive answers despite the research atten tion it has attracted (Genest and Zidek 1986) . Al though we doubt that defi nitive solutions are forth coming from any quarter, we point out that market mechanisms of various sorts are widely used in un certain contexts, and their function as aggregators of belief are well-recognized. For example, the price of a stock represents the "market evaluation" of the ex pected present value of future dividends, and odds in a horse race aggregate the bettors' beliefs about the winning horse's identity.
Despite their commonality and well-developed under lying theory, there appear to have been few attempts in the uncertain reasoning community at principled ap plication of market ideas for belief aggregation. Specif ically, to our knowledge, nobody has proposed a com prehensive market architecture for belief aggregation. 1
DISTRIBUTED PROB A BILISTIC INFERENCE AND DECISION UNDER UNCERTA INTY
Belief aggregation is an instance of the more general problem of coordinating belief and decision among a collection of agents. If probabilistic information is dis tributed across multiple sources, we face the problem of combining this information to address queries and decisions dependent on disparate pieces.
1 though Hanson (1991) has presented an informed ar gument for, and preliminary investigation of, the idea. In particular, he has advocated setting up a market in sci entific claims, where prices summarize consensus opinions about important research questions (Hanson 1995 (1995) ) for the precise statement and detailed development of these concepts.
To be sufficient, a set of securities markets must span the set of possible states of nature, 0. This requires in general 0(101) securities. If the set of markets is incomplete, allocations dictated by the price system may be inefficient (i.e., Pareto dominated), even if the economy is otherwise well-behaved.
Of course, research in uncertain reasoning is largely concerned with representing beliefs over 0, and one of the major ideas is that structure in this set may lead to more compact and otherwise advantageous specifica tions. In particular, we typically structureD by factor ing it into a product of random variables, and achieve savings in encoding (e.g., in Bayesian networks) by ex ploiting independence among the random variables.
A natural question, then, is whether ideas about struc turing probabilistic relations among random variables can be exploited in the design of configurations of se curities markets. We believe the work presented below provides evidence for an answer in the affirmative.
OVERVIEW
In this paper we present one approach toward building a market system for Bayesian inference. We propose a market structure to represent a joint probability distri bution over a set of binary random variables. Specifi cally, we delineate a precise mapping from a Bayesian network to an economy, where consumers and pro ducers exchange goods representing uncertain propo sitions. The resulting system, called MarketBayes, is shown to effectively "compute" the same probabilistic information as the original Bayesian network. While this paper focuses on the particulars of the Market Hayes construction, our aim is not the constructed market system per se, but rather its use as a foun dation for future investigations of the broader issues entertained above.
In the next section, we provide some general back ground on the microeconomic framework employed. In Section 4, we introduce the MarketBayes model, begin ning with the basic agents and goods that comprise our market structure. The complete mapping from Bayesian networks to market structures is presented in Section 5, along with some theorems characterizing the correspondence between the resulting market price system and the original joint probability distribution. We illustrate the method further by example in Sec tion 6, and conclude in the subsequent section with a discussion and assessment of our results.
ECONOMIC FUNDAMENTALS
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM FRAMEWORK
A market price system is defined by a set of K goods indexed 1, ... , K and a price vector p = (PI, ... , PK) that associates a price with each good. The system requires that all goods be exchanged in proportion to their relative prices.
Goods are exchanged by two types of agents consumers and producers. Consumer agents re ceive value from direct consumption of the goods (metaphorically, they "eat" the goods). Let x = (xi, . . . , XK) denote a consumption bundle where each Xi E �+ specifies the quantity of good i consumed. The consumption bundles are ranked according to preference by the consumer's utility function u (x) :
at:f -� . Consumers also start with an initial allo cation of the goods, termed their endowment and de noted by e = ( e1, ... , ex). The consumer's objective is to choose an affordable bundle of goods, x, so as to maximize its utility. A bundle is affordable if its total cost at the going prices does not exceed the value of the consumer's endowment at the same prices. The con sumer's choice can thus be expressed as the following constrained optimization problem:
(1)
X
Agents of the second type, producers, extract value from goods by transforming them into other goods, and selling their product in the market. A producer's ability to transform goods is defi ned by its technology, Y C � K , which specifies the set of feasible produc tion vectors. If y = (y1, . . . , Y K ) is feasible, then the producer is capable of transforming bundles of input goods (goods i for which y; < 0) into bundles of output goods (y; > 0), in respective amounts IY d.
Unlike the consumer, a producer has no preferences in the sense of agent-specific desires. Rather, we as sume that a producer selects its production activity solely according to profit-the difference between the value of its output and the cost of its input, evaluated at a given set of prices. The producer's constrained optimization problem can be expressed succinctly as
An agent is competitive if it takes prices as given, ig noring the potential effect of its own choices on re sulting prices. The agent definitions above assume competitive behavior, in that the prices are treated as parameters of the respective optimization prob lems. Note that only relative prices matter; behav ior is unchanged if all prices are multiplied by a posi tive constant. We typically scale prices by designating one good (the fi rst, without loss of generality) as nu meraire, with a fixed price, PI = 1.
Consider an economy with consumers indexed 1, . . . , m and producers indexed m + 1, ... , n. A competitive equilibrium for this economy is a set of prices, p, such that all of the goods are in material balance, where xi and y i denote the solutions of consumer or producer i's respective optimization problem, as de fined above, at prices p.
CONTINGENT GOODS
In economic theory, uncertainty is addressed by intro ducing contingent goods, whose tangible realization depends on some uncertain event. In the standard model, trading is divided into two periods. In the first period (before uncertainty is resolved) agents trade ex clusively in securities. After uncertainty is resolved, agents trade in the real goods, using income from their securities holdings.
Since we are developing a market for uncertainty in the abstract (i.e., no explicit real goods), we consider a one-stage model, with the securities treated as if nor mal goods. Consider a security that pays one "dollar" if an uncertain proposition a is true, and nothing oth erwise. If an agent is risk neutral for dollars, then its valuation of this good is exactly that of having Pr(a) dollars. If dollar is the numeraire, then the price at which the agent would be indifferent between buying one unit of the contingent good and one dollar is ex actly Pr( a). Thus, the equilibrium price in this in stance corresponds with the probability.
More generally, we interpret the price of a good as "the market probability" for that good. If participat ing consumers have different assessments of the proba bility, then their relative wealth and risk aversion will determine their influence on the equilibrium price.
The market structure we define below is comprised en tirely of contingent goods of the form: "$1 if a", for propositions of interest a. We specify preferences over these goods directly, rather than assigning beliefs in the propositions and preferences for dollars. Our selec tion of which propositions to include and our definition of the participating agents are designed to achieve an equilibrium where the prices correspond to a specified probability distribution.
MARKETBAYES BUILDING BLOCKS
The MarketBayes model is a particular approach we have developed to represent joint probability distribu tions over sets of binary random variables in terms of general-equilibrium economic systems. The market representation is designed to exploit conditional inde pendencies among propositions, based on the struc ture of a Bayesian network. Specifi cally, we present a mapping from a Bayesian network with binary proposi tional nodes to an "equivalent" confi guration of goods, consumers, and producers. In this section, we present the basic economic constructs that form the building blocks of the MarketBayes economy. Section 5 presents the complete mapping, and characterizes the corre spondence between the resulting market price system and the original Bayesian network.
We represent propositions formed from conjunctions of nodes in the network as contingent goods in the econ omy. Let a be a proposition, and (a} the corresponding good in the market model. We also use the notation (a) as a variable denoting the price of the good; the specific interpretation is resolvable in context. By de sign the equilibrium price of the good should equal the probability of the corresponding proposition, i.e., (a) = Pr(a). We define next the MarketBayes con sumers and producers employed in pursuit of this equi librium behavior.
THE CONSUMERS
In a Bayesian network, the basic unit of information is a conditional probability. For example, a node a2 with sole predecessor a1 is accompanied by the information Pr(a21at) = k where k is some probability. Using the definition of conditional probability, the same equation can be rewritten as Pr(a1a2) = k Pr(al ). In the Mar ketBayes economy, we wish to enforce the same ratio between the prices of the goods:
Our approach to maintaining this relation is to intro duce a consumer that considers the relative value of the good (a1a2) to be k times the value of the good (a I). If the ratio of the prices diverges from k, the consumer will buy or sell accordingly, tending to drive the ratio toward k.
The MarketBayes model employs CES (constant elas ticity of substitution) consumers for this purpose. The CES utility function for two goods takes the form 2 u(x1,x2)= (at(xt(;1 +a2(x2)";1) .. :1,
where the ai are coefficients dictating the relative val ues of the two goods, and rr is a global substitution parameter dictating the degree to which consumption in one good (at proportions dictated by the a; ) can substitute for the other.
Let p1 and p2 be the prices of the two goods. The consumer's optimization problem (1), as usual, is to maximize its utility function ( 4) subject to its budget constraint. For CES consumers this problem has a closed-form solution:
2CES forms are commonly employed in general equililr rium modeling (Shoven and Whalley 1992), due to their flexibility and convenient analytical properties.
To implement an equation of the form (3), we in troduce a CES consumer interested in the two goods (a1a2} and {ai}. The consumer is endowed with an equal amount e1 = e 2 = e of each good (the exact value does not matter for the current purpose, as long as e > 0). By setting a1 = k and a 2 = 1, we encode the desired conditional probability. Although the re lation is strictly enforced (according to Theorem 1 be low) only as � ---> oo, we have found in practice that convergence to the correct price ratio typically obtains for values of u > 4 or so.
Theorem 1 Let (a1a2}* and (a1}* be equilibrium prices for the two goods in an economy containing the CES consumer defined above, with rr -00. If lirn,...., 00 ({' a)f is finite and bounded away from zero, a1 then it is k.
Proof (sketch). In competitive equilibrium, by defini tion, the consumer is solving its optimization problem. The first-order conditions for that optimization prob lem dictate that the marginal utility per unit price be constant across goods. In particular,
(a1a2)• = { a t)*· Substituting the marginal utilities and rearranging,
which approaches k as u -oo, as long as the Xi are bounded away from zero. For CES consumers, this will be true as long as the price ratio is finite and bounded away from zero. Thus, {a1a2)* = k{a1)*, which is Equation (3) exactly. 0
The alert reader may observe that the same result could have been obtained more directly using the lin ear utility function , u ( x1, x2) = kx1 + x2. Indeed, the CES utility function approaches linearity in the limit. However, with linear utility the equilibrium would be more fragile-two consumers with different k would prevent existence. Moreover, for linear utility func tions the optimal demand function is discontinuous in prices, and reaching equilibrium through a distributed, incremental bidding process becomes more difficult.
Note that Theorem 1 requires only that there exist one such CES consumer. It is true vacuously when there is no equilibrium. For situations with more than one CES consumer connecting the same pair of goods with differing k values, the result still holds because we take the u for only one of them to infinity.
4.2
THE PRODUCERS
Whereas the role of consumers in a Market Bayes econ omy is to encode conditional probabilities, we employ producers to implement identities of probability the ory. Producers act as arbitrageurs, converting between logically equivalent bundles of goods. 3 For example, the propositional identity can be expressed in a producer with the technology to convert a unit of (at} into one unit each of (ata2} and (ata2}, or vice versa. This producer's technology ex hibits constant returns to scale, that is, it can perform this transform at any volume level.
The corresponding probabilistic identity, Pr(at) = Pr(ata2)+Pr(ata2), can likewise be expressed in terms of a constraint on prices of goods:
The arbitrageur effectively enforces this equation by its bidding policy. If the price (at} diverges from the sum {a1a2} + {a1a2}, the producer can make profits by transforming one side to the other. Its resulting de mand behavior will tend to drive the respective input and output prices towards equality.
The producer's goal is to maximize profits (2). For the producer associated with the identity above, the profits when transforming y units of {al) into y each of (a1a2) and {a1a2) (note that if y is negative, the transformation goes the other way) are simply
Theorem 2 Let (a1)•, (a1a2}", and (ata2}* be the equilibrium prices for the three goods in an economy containing the arbitrage producer defined above. Then
Proof. Competitive producers must be maximizing profits in equilibrium. But the profit function (8) has a bounded maximizer y (finite production) only if Equa tion 7 holds. 0 Note that the producer always makes zero profit in equilibrium (this is true in general for competitive, constant-returns producers). Results analogous to Theorem 2 can be derived for arbitrageurs representing identities of the form (7) but with arbitrary numbers of propositions on the right-hand side.
30ur expression of the laws of probability in arbi trageurs can be viewed as a direct embodiment of Nau and McCardle's argument (1991) that all rationality or coher ence principles ultimately reduce to "no-arbitrage" postu lates.
THE MARKETBAYES SYSTEM
In this section we piece together the individual compo nents described above into an interconnected market price system. We describe a general mapping from a Bayesian network with binary nodes to a MarketBayes configuration of goods, consumers, and producers. We show how the economy effectively represents the same information as the Bayesian network.
We are interested in three general properties that such a mapping may possess. Each property subsumes the previous and, in general, the properties are successively harder to verify. In the following sections, we construct the MarketBayes econ omy incrementally in two stages. After stage one, we prove that Property 1 holds; after stage two we prove that Property 2 holds. The goods in the economy specified in Section 5 .1-remain constant across both stages. In Section 5.2, we define stage one of the map ping, a set of consumers sufficient to establish the Ex istence Property for arbitrary Bayesian networks. In Section 5.3 we define stage two of the mapping, adding producers to the economy to ensure the Uniqueness Property for a non-restrictive class of Bayesian net works. We do not yet have a general proof of the Con vergence Property (except for complete graphs, not presented), but we conjecture that our price adjust ment algorithm (Cheng and Wellman 1996) does con verge for a broad class of MarketBayes economies. Our computational experience thus far supports this con jecture, and in Section 6 we present a concrete exam ple that does indeed converge when implemented as a computational economy.
THE GOODS
The goods in a MarketBayes economy are conjunctions of literals, each the value of a node in the Bayesian network. However, rather than include all such con junctions explicitly as goods, we attempt to exploit the independencies present in a (possibly sparse) Bayesian network graph. For each node a; in the network we add to the economy goods for all 2q+ 1 possible conjunctions of a; and its parents:4
We also add to the economy all 2q possible conjunc tions of the parents of a; alone, if these goods are not already included in those defined previously.
Finally we add a single good (T) which corresponds to the proposition true. {T) is the numeraire of the economy and thus its price is 1 by definition.
The economy then consists of 0(2qn) goods, where q is the maximum number of parents for a node and n is the number of nodes.
STAGE ONE: THE CONSUMERS
For each node a;, the given Bayesian network pro vides us with 2q conditional probabilities, of the form Pr(a;lahai� ···a;. ) = k. These conditional probabili ties dictate that the following 2q ratios between prices of goods must hold:
(a·a· a· ···a· ) (1-k2)(a· a· ···a· )
Root nodes in the Bayesian network can be handled in the same way by considering them to be children of the proposition true, with "conditional" probability Pr(a;ltrue) = k.
In the MarketBayes model, CES consumers effectively implement equations of the form (9) and (10). Specif ically, we add 2 · 2q consumers to the economy for each node a;-one for each of the equations in (9) and (10).
The consumers are instantiated as described in Sec tion 4.1.
�Though each node may have a different number of par ents, we conserve subscripts and use q for the number of parents of the current node.
Theorem 3 Property 1 (Existence) holds for the mapping from any Bayesian network to the set of goods and consumers defined above.
Proof. We need to show that the probabilities of propositions in the Bayesian network form a (possi bly nonunique) price equilibrium in the MarketBayes economy. A set of prices constitutes an equilibrium if the resulting demand is in material balance, that is, there is no excess demand in the economy at those prices. Probabilities represented by the Bayesian network obey the ratios described in Equations (9) and (10), by construction. Then it suffices to show that any set of prices that satisfies these equations im plies zero excess demand in the economy. Consider the CES consumer associated with the first condi tional probability in (9). Let P l = (aiai 1 a; � · · · a;9) and P2 :::: : (ai, ai, · · · ai q ) be the prices of the two rel evant goods. From (9) we have that P 1 = k1P2· The demands for each good (from (5) and (6)) are then: k111(k1p2e + p2e) P 2 11 (k 1 11(k1p2)1-o-+ P2 1 -11) pze(kl + 1) pze(kl + 1) --e P2 k 1 + P2 -P2(k1 + 1) -In other words, at the specified price ratio, the con sumer demands exactly the amounts it is endowed with. Since the same argument applies to every con sumer in the economy, the total excess demand must be zero. Thus, any set of prices that satisfies (9) and (10) constitutes a competitive equilibrium for the economy, and the Existence Property is established . D Note that this result does not require u -+ oo, as did Theorem 1. If consumers other than the ones speci fied in our construction are present, then the network probabilities may not constitute a price equilibrium. A graph is moral if every two parents of a node are connected ("married"), for all nodes in the graph. 5 Forests (collections of trees) are a subset of moral graphs, since every node has at most one parent. Com plete graphs are also a subset of moral graphs since ev ery two nodes are connected. Any graph can be moral ized by adding directed links in the graph between ev ery two unconnected parent nodes, making sure to re tain the acyclic nature of the network. Adding new di rected links introduces new parent relationships which in turn may require additional "moralization" links. Thus, in principle the MarketBayes mapping applies to arbitrary network structures. However, the process of moralization introduces, in the worst case, an expo nential number of additional conditional relationships.
As above, let at, ... , an be the nodes of the Bayesian network. Without loss of generality, we can assume the index labels on the nodes are consistent with the partial order represented by the directed graph: if a; is an ancestor of aj then i < j. Note that at is always a root node (no parents) and an is always a leaf node (no children). Since the network is moral, the parents of a;-a; 1 , ••• , a;9 -form a complete subset of the graph. Furthermore, (taking, again without loss of generality, it < · · · < iq), the nodes a;1, a;l, ••• , a;9_1 must all be parents of the node a;0• Let W; be the set of parents of the node a;. that are not also parents of a;. This structure is depicted in Figure 1 .
The set W; represents the additional nodes required to specify a joint distribution over the parents of a;. For each node a;, we generate arbitrageurs (according to the scheme of Section 4.2) representing the following probabilistic identities:
The term "moral" in the literature typically refers to the undirected moral relative of a directed graph (N eapoli tan 1990}. In this paper we use the term as defined above to describe directed graphs only.
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The summations are over all possible combinations of the propositions in the set W;. Note that if the set W; is empty for some i, then we need not add any producers to the economy for node a;. If the Bayesian network is a complete graph, then the set W; will be empty for all i; in this case producers are simply not necessary.
Theorem 4 Property 2 (Uniqueness) holds for the mapping from any moral Bayesian network to the set of goods, consumers, and producers defined above.
Proof. From Theorems 1 and 2 it is clear that the consumer equations in (9) and (10), along with the producer equations in (11), must hold simultaneously in equilibrium. The probabilities of the propositions in the Bayesian network must satisfy these equations since they correspond directly to the given condi tional probabilities plus identities in probability the ory. Therefore, we need only show that there is a unique set of prices that satisfies this set of equations instantiated for the configuration of this economy. The proof is by induction. Let G; be the set of goods added to the economy for proposition a;, namely, all possi ble conjunctions of a; with its parents plus all possible conjunctions of its parents alone. Mathematically,
G;
{{a;ah ···a;.), ... ,(a;a;1 ·· ·a;. )} U {(a;1···a;9}, ••• ,(a;1 ···a;9)}.
• Base Case. Define the set Go to be {{T) }. The good (T) is the numeraire and its price is main tained at unity by definition. Thus the price of the good in the set Go is uniquely determined.
• Induction. Assume that all of the prices of goods in the sets Go, G1, ... , G;_1 are uniquely deter mined. We want to prove that all of the prices of goods in the set G; are uniquely determined. Con sider the general situation as depicted in Figure 1 . The prices of the goods in the set G; . are uniquely determined since iq < i. Among the goods in the set G; 9 are the goods in the sets U(W; a; 1 a; � · ·· a;.) , ... , U( W ;a;1 a;2
where Uw, is the union over all possible conjunc tions of the propositions in the set W;. These are exactly the goods on the right hand side of (11). Thus the prices of the goods on the left hand side of ( 11) must be uniquely determined. These goods are in turn exactly those on the right hand sides of (9) and (10). Thus the prices of the goods on the left hand sides of (9) and (10) must be uniquely determined. The goods on the left hand sides of (9), (10), and (11) are exactly those goods in the set G;. D Note that the price system in an equilibrium Market Hayes economy is sufficient to recover the complete joint distribution, as it specifies all conditional proba bilities in the original Bayesian network.
AN EXAMPLE ECONOMY
In this section we construct a concrete MarketBayes economy using the technique described in the previ ous section. We provide empirical verification of the system by reporting results of running the example in an actual computational economy. For this example, the prices of goods converge correctly to the probabil ities of the corresponding propositions in the Bayesian network.
The example Bayesian network is pictured in Figure 2 . It is already moral, so we need not add any additional links. Let the conditional probabilities associated with the example network be as follows:
Pr(a2lat) = 0.3 Pr( a a lilt a2) = 0.22 Pr(aalata2) = 0.44 Pr(a4laa) = 0.85
The goods in the economy consist of all combinations of each node with its parents,
and all combinations of each node's parents alone, if not already included in the group above. In this ex ample, the combinations of the parent of node a4 still need to be added.
(a a } , (aa} Finally we add the numeraire good {T) to the economy.
For each conditional probability in the Bayesian net work we add a consumer. For this example we have consumers enforcing the following relationships:
We also add the complementary consumers defined by Equation (10).
Consider the first equation above, (at) = 0.4(T}. The CES consumer representing this relationship has an interest in the two goods (at) and {T), with CES a coefficients of 0.4 and 1, respectively. In our computa tional market we endow the consumer with an amount e = 10 of each good, and set the global substitution parameter cr to 50. The remaining consumers are in stantiated in the same way.
For each node in the Bayesian network we add the arbitrage producers defined in Equation 11. In this example, we need to add producers only for node a4, since the set wi is empty for i # 4.
This collection of goods, consumers, and producers forms a complete MarketBayes economy. We have im plemented this example in our market-oriented pro gramming environment, WALRAS, which provides some general facilities for specifying computational mar kets (Wellman 1993) . Given the specification of agents and goods, the WALRAS distributed bidding protocol attempts to find a competitive equilibrium via an asyn chronous, iterative, price-adjustment process (Cheng and Wellman 1996) . In the WALRAS bidding protocol, each agent submits demand functions for each of the goods they are interested in to the auctions for the respective goods. The auction then sets the price so as to clear its market. When the prices change, the agents may submit new bids, and the process iterates. For this example economy, the MarketBayes prices in deed converge correctly to within 0.001 of the correct probabilities.
We can also use the market results to recover probabil ities of propositions that are not explicitly represented as goods in the system. Since the conditional probabil ities in a Bayesian network capture the complete joint distribution, the probability of any propositional ex pression can be recovered through additions and multi plications of MarketBayes prices. For example, {a1a3} can be computed by summing {ata2a3}+{a1a2a3}. For simple summations like this, we can generate an ex plicit arbitrageur to produce the desired good. How ever, determining the probabilities of general expres sions and conditionals may require new types of agents, or even off-line calculations using the prices of existing goods.
DIS CUSS ION
In this paper, we have presented a specific technique for mapping a Bayesian network to a market system where prices are probabilities. Our market model encodes uncertain propositions as goods, conditional probabilities as consumers, and the laws of probabil ity as arbitrage producers. We have shown that the competitive equilibrium of our system is unique, and corresponds to the joint probability distribution rep resented by the original Bayesian network.
We view the main contribution of this work to be an existence argument. We are fairly certain that there are other plausible mappings, some perhaps with ad vantages over the approach presented here (though we do believe that MarketBayes has some interesting fea tures!).
The existence of a market model for Bayesian infer ence is the first step toward addressing some of the motivating research questions posed at the outset. We conjecture that market price systems will support a useful class of belief aggregation mechanisms, due to their high degree of decentralization, intuitive inter pretation of interactions, and well-developed analyt ical theory. Within the MarketBayes framework, we can specify agents with differing beliefs (preference co efficient, k), rigidity of belief (substitution parameter, o-),6 and relative importance (endowment, e) . Mar ketBayes aggregates these consumers to derive an in termediate price; in ongoing work we are investigating the properties of this aggregation.
Market systems also have potential applications in dis tributed reasoning under uncertainty, where agents cannot be centrally coordinated due to high com munication costs, actual physical separation, security concerns, or other reasons. In a precise sense, the competitive mechanism uses minimal communication (prices) to achieve-in particular, well-characterized 6 Under a suitable interpretation of the contingent goods, u can be considered a risk aversion parameter, with risk neutrality at q = oo. The more risk averse the agent, the more it prefers to hedge its beliefs by refraining from bets with positive expected payoff. Finally, the MarketBayes model also demonstrates that independence structure in uncertain belief states can be exploited to reduce the number of markets nec essary to constitute a complete configuration. This may prove advantageous for problems of resource al location under uncertainty, where the general theory would require unthinkable numbers of securities.
